Cisco 300-740 Designing and Implementing Secure Cloud Access for Users and Endpoints (SCAZT) Exam Practice Test

The anyconnect keep-installer none command is used to remove the Cisco Secure Client (formerly AnyConnect) from an endpoint once the VPN session ends. This is useful in temporary or kiosk-based access environments. The default behavior retains the client.

This capability is covered in SCAZT Section 2: User and Device Security (Pages 40–44), which outlines VPN session lifecycle management and Secure Client policies.

Cisco Talos is Cisco’s threat intelligence organization, delivering real-time threat intelligence and malware analytics to help organizations detect and prevent threats before they impact the network. According to the SCAZT guide, Talos provides comprehensive coverage of threat data including signatures, indicators of compromise, and context-driven analytics. This intelligence feeds into Cisco security platforms such as Cisco SecureX and Cisco Secure Endpoint to enhance detection, investigation, and response capabilities. Talos is explicitly referenced in the Threat Response section as the primary source of threat intelligence and malware analytics that supports cloud and endpoint security frameworks.

When integrating Cisco ISE with Azure AD using SAML SSO:

B: The Azure AD metadata must be uploaded into ISE to establish trust and allow token validation.

D: External Identity Sources settings must be configured in ISE to recognize and process authentication requests via SAML-based identity providers like Azure AD.

These are mandatory steps for enabling browser-based SSO authentication in ISE as explained in SCAZT Section 2 (User and Device Security, Pages 42–44), which describes federated identity integration.

Note: Option A is already completed as stated in the prompt. Options C and E are not essential to the authentication flow in this SAML context.

In Cisco ASA configurations using IKEv2, the integrity command defines the hash algorithm. To use SHA-512, the correct syntax is:

integrity sha512

Without this, the IKEv2 proposal is considered incomplete or mismatched with the peer. The encryption command sets encryption (AES-256, etc.), not hashing. The correct structure is:

crypto ikev2 policy <#>

encryption aes-256

integrity sha512

group 2

prf sha512

lifetime 86400

To enable VPN load balancing with secure encryption between Cisco ASA firewalls, two additional commands are required:

encryption aes 256: Defines the encryption scheme used in the load balancing cluster. Without specifying encryption, secure key exchanges between devices will not occur properly.

cluster encryption: Enables encrypted communication between the clustered ASA devices. Without this command, cluster member synchronization is not securely established.

The commands shown in the exhibit correctly configure the cluster key and virtual IP but lack the necessary encryption parameters. According to Cisco’s VPN load balancing implementation guides and reinforced in the SCAZT documentation, these two settings are required to secure the VPN session load distribution.

Multifactor Authentication (MFA) is one of the most effective mitigations against brute-force attacks. Even if an attacker guesses or steals a user’s password, they would still need a second authentication factor (e.g., push notification, hardware token, biometric verification) to complete login.

SCAZT Section 2: User and Device Security (Pages 40–43) emphasizes the importance of MFA in protecting identities from password spraying, credential stuffing, and brute-force attacks.

When integrating Duo Authentication Proxy with Active Directory for multifactor authentication (MFA), you must:

Configure the Identity Source in the Duo Admin Panel as Active Directory (not SAML), since it’s using the Authentication Proxy.

Configure the authentication proxy settings in the [sso] section to communicate with both AD and the Duo cloud.

This setup allows Active Directory to be the primary identity store while Duo provides the second authentication factor.

The screenshot from Cisco Secure Cloud Analytics shows a Role Violation alert. According to the “Supporting Observations” pane, the device with IP 10.201.0.15 is assigned the role of Domain Controller but has demonstrated traffic behavior matching an FTP client, connecting to ports 20, 21, 115, 152, 989, and 990. This discrepancy triggered the alert.

Cisco SCAZT documentation emphasizes that devices acting outside their expected network roles (e.g., a domain controller acting as an FTP client) indicate potential compromise or misuse. Role-based anomaly detection is part of Visibility and Assurance mechanisms where baseline behaviors are continuously monitored and flagged when changes occur outside expected policy or operational norms.

Based on the Cisco Tetration segmentation policy and the requirement to allow only web server communication (HTTP/HTTPS):

Rule 1 allows HTTP (port 80) — required

Rule 2 allows HTTPS (port 443) — required

Rule 3 allows SSH — not needed for web communication

Rule 4 allows UDP port 68 (DHCP) — not relevant to application-layer web server traffic

Therefore, Rules 3 and 4 are unnecessary and should be deleted for policy optimization, which aligns with zero-trust and least-privilege access design as outlined in SCAZT Section 4 (Application and Data Security, Pages 86–90).

In Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC), access control policies are processed top-down—meaning the first matching rule is applied, and the remaining are ignored. Based on the exhibit, Rule 4 (Access Controlled Groups) is likely being shadowed by a broader rule above it that permits web traffic. To ensure restricted users are denied access to mobile phone shopping categories, Rule 4 must be moved to the top of the rule hierarchy.

Cisco SCAZT (Section 5: Visibility and Assurance, Pages 94–97) describes best practices for rule ordering and inspection logic. Moving the specific block rule (Rule 4) higher ensures it's enforced before general allow rules are evaluated.

The App Discovery function in Cisco Umbrella enables organizations to identify cloud applications in use across their environment, including unsanctioned or shadow IT services. This is crucial for risk assessments and ranking cloud services based on their risk profile.

App Discovery analyzes DNS and web traffic to detect SaaS applications and assigns a risk score to each app based on industry best practices and Cisco Talos threat intelligence.

It provides visibility into cloud service usage and supports decisions about which applications should be allowed, restricted, or blocked.

???? Reference (Cisco SCAZT Guide):

Section: Visibility and Assurance

Topic: Cisco Umbrella > App Discovery

Key Statement: "App Discovery helps identify cloud applications in use and provides risk ratings for each, allowing organizations to apply governance policies to risky or unsanctioned cloud services."

Pages: 84–86

The provided JSON-like policy structure shows a segmentation rule with action "BLOCK" and filters referencing the HTTPS Consumer and HTTPS Provider. However, to block HTTP, you must define the protocol explicitly in the parameters. The attribute “l4_params” is currently empty. According to Cisco Secure Workload best practices (SCAZT Section 4: Application and Data Security, Pages 88–91), Layer 4 parameters (l4_params) must be used to specify protocols such as HTTP or port 80. Without defining HTTP here, the policy does not apply to HTTP traffic.

The Cisco SAFE architecture uses the concept of Secure Domains as foundational blocks. These domains represent areas of the network (e.g., Branch, Data Center, Cloud, Edge) that require specific security controls. Each domain aligns with controls across visibility, segmentation, threat protection, and identity services.

After Cloudlock is integrated with Salesforce, full visibility into objects and data requires that Cloudlock has the “View All Data” permission enabled on the connected Salesforce account. This permission allows the Cloudlock API connection to access all user data, regardless of individual field-level or sharing rules. Without it, Cloudlock will be limited in its visibility scope.

As per SCAZT (Section 4: Application and Data Security, Pages 86–89), integration with SaaS platforms like Salesforce must include enabling comprehensive data visibility to perform effective risk analysis and policy enforcement.

The screenshot from Cisco ISE shows a configuration of a “File Condition” posture check that verifies the existence and version of the “Srv.sys” file in the System32 directory. This is a known method to validate if a Windows device has received a critical security patch (in this case, one related to protection against the WannaCry vulnerability, MS17-010). Cisco ISE does not rely solely on a patch management system for this type of validation but can use specific file version and path checks. Therefore, the correct posture condition is File Condition.

Based on the alert of “Geographically Unusual Remote Access” from Secure Cloud Analytics and the SSH logs from foreign IPs, this device (linux-gcp-east-4c) has likely been compromised. According to SCAZT Section 6: Threat Response (Pages 114–117):

B: Isolating/quarantining the host is an immediate incident response step to prevent lateral movement and data exfiltration.

E: A firewall rule blocking inbound SSH to the GCP VM from external sources would be the appropriate access control response to prevent recurrence.

Options A and C (reinstallation) may be used later during recovery but are not immediate containment steps. Blocking outgoing SSH (Option D) is less relevant than restricting inbound SSH in this scenario.

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) includes an “Inbox” tab where detected threats and flagged endpoints are listed. When Duo Trusted Endpoints integration is in place, an endpoint may be denied access if it fails posture checks. The correct workflow includes reviewing the machine’s status in Cisco Secure Endpoint and marking the incident as “Resolved” in the Inbox tab to restore authentication.

This process is described in SCAZT Section 2 (User and Device Security, Pages 44–46) for enforcing endpoint trust with Secure Endpoint and Duo Trusted Endpoints integration.